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PRIVATE LAW
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
Although the Louisiana appellate courts handed down more
than a hundred decisions on workmen's compensation during
the past term, most of these either were resolutions of factual
disputes or involved only reiterations of familiar rules and prin-
ciples. This reviewer was unable to locate more than a dozen
decisions whose novelty or contribution to the compensation law
of Louisiana justifies any extended comment.
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
An inmate of a penitentiary is not regarded as an employee
entitled to compensation. This is true in the absence of a special
provision in the compensation statute, even though the prisoner
is paid an incentive remuneration for the work performed and
the work is of financial value to the state. This accepted posi-
tion was adopted by the court of appeal in Jones v. Houston
Fire & Casualty Ins. Co.1 In view of the statutory requirement
of a contract of hire, the conclusion reached is not subject to
criticism. Nevertheless this is an area that is in need of thought-
ful legislative attention. The penal laws contemplate that most
prisoners will eventually be released, and the social need for
compensation here is as great as in the case of the employee who
was injured while working under a voluntarily executed con-
tract of hire. In several states there are appropriate provisions
for the injured or killed prisoner.2
Situations in which it becomes necessary to distinguish be-
tween the employee and the independent contractor have become
comparatively rare since the 1948 amendment to the act which
abrogates all distinction between the two except in those in-
stances where the claimant cannot show that a substantial part
of his work time was spent in manual labor in carrying out the
terms of the contract.3 The distinction, however, must still be
dealt with when the injured claimant is a roving salesman
(whose work can seldom be classified as manual labor) and
:who may be relatively free of control as to his hours or place of
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 134 So. 2d 377 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
2. E.g., MD. CODE art. 101, § 47 (1939) ; Wis. Laws 1951, ch. 539.
3. LA. R.S. 23:1021(6) (1950).
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work. A rigid adherence to the outworn control test might sug-
gest that such sales agents are not employees entitled to com-
pensation. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the statute the im-
portant observation is that salesmen of this kind are economi-
cally subservient units of the enterprise they represent, and
they cannot properly be regarded as independent enterprisers
with bargaining power adequate to exact a charge sufficient to
enable them to support their own accident costs. Hence they fall
within the purpose of the act and are properly classified as
employees. 4 The status of salesmen has been before our courts
on several occasions, and in each instance they were classified
as employees. The facts, however, have indicated that the sales
agent worked a designated route and that his activities were
subject to control at least to that extent.5 More recently the
Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit has classified as em-
ployee a used-car salesman working under a loose arrangement
who was paid on a commission basis and who worked when and
where he wished.6
The decision in question seems eminently sound with respect
to the claimant's entitlement to compensation from his employer.
The court, however, denied recovery against the employer's
insurer on the ground that the compensation insurance policy
expressly excluded automobile salesmen. The pertinent statutory
provision here is R.S. 23:1162, which, in part, states: "No policy
of insurance against liability under this Chapter shall be made
unless the policy covers the entire liability of the employer...."
The court concluded that this provision does not preclude the
insurer and insured from excepting a specific class of employees
from protection. The court did not refer to its own earlier
opinion in Stepan v. Louisiana State Board of Education.7 In
that case the court had expressed its satisfaction with the posi-
tion that a workmen's compensation insurance policy is a statu-
tory policy and that with the terms of the statute the policy
must comply. It had also approved the proposition that the con-
tract of insurance may not limit its coverage to less than the
full liability of the employer. The Stepan opinion continued:
"This is particularly applicable to all phases of any par-
4. Cf. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICz
574 (1951).
5. E.g., O'Connor v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 87 So. 2d 16 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1956) ; Samson v. Borden Co., 92 So. 2d 152 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
6. Gresham v. Speights, 133 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
7. 78 So. 2d 18 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
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ticular business. A policy purporting to cover only a limited
number of activities of a particular business would be con-
strued as covering all activities of that business under the
statute."s
The statutory provision in question expressly permits an
employer who is engaged in more than one business to cover
each separate and distinct business by separate policies. By
reference to this express exception the court in the Stepan case
concluded that the insurer of the State Board of Education could
effectively insure the Board's compensation liability with refer-
ence to certain designated schools without rendering itself liable
as insurer for all institutions under the Board's jurisdiction.
The latter was regarded as conducting numerous businesses in
operating the forty educational institutions of the state. But
by the same token it could hardly be contended that the opera-
tions of car salesmen constituted a "separate business" for the
Caddo Auto Sales Agency, the insured in the instant case.
In defense of the instant decision it might be argued that in
Louisiana, the only American state that has neglected to make
compensation insurance compulsory, the result reached by the
court in the case under discussion will encourage reluctant em-
ployers to secure at least limited coverage for those of their
employees who can be protected at cheaper rates. The soundness
of this concession seems questionable, however, in view of the
express language of the statute and in light of the obvious
desirability of insisting upon complete insurance protection
wherever possible. The obvious and desperately needed remedy,
of course, is an amendment of the statute to inaugurate com-
pulsory compensation insurance in Louisiana.
BORROWED EMPLOYEES-RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION OR INDEMNITY
In an earlier issue of the Review9 it was pointed out that in
Humphreys v. Marquette Casualty Co.10 the Supreme Court of
Louisiana adopted a growing (although still minority) position
to the effect that a loaned employee may recover compensation
from both the lending (general) employer and the borrowing
(special) employer. The liability of the two was described in
8. Id. at 21.
9. Note, 19 LA. L. REv. 923 (1959).
10. 235 La. 355, 103 So. 2d 895 (1958). The case is discussed in the 1962
Pocket Supplement to MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW &
Ps AcTI 557 (1951).
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a dictum as solidary. Once the position has become established
that the borrowed employee may recover compensation from
either the lender or the borrower, there arises the further ques-
tion as to what adjustment, if any, should be made between the
two employers once the employee has received satisfaction of
his claim from one or the other and is out of the picture.
Recently in Casualty Reciprocal Exchange Drilling Co. v.
Richey Drilling & Well Service" the Court of Appeal for the
Fourth Circuit held that the borrowing (special) employer is
entitled to indemnity from the lending (general) employer or
the latter's insurer. The decision is carefully restricted to the
situation where the lender is engaged in the business of lending
specialist workers to others. This decision is an important one
and it deserves extended comment. However, in view of the fact
that the case will receive detailed treatment in a forthcoming
issue of the Review, no discussion of it here is attempted beyond
the observations that the decision strikes the reviewer as emi-
nently sound, and that the conclusion that the borrower is
entitled to indemnity from the vocational lender is consistent
with the analogous situation where the principal who is obliged
to pay compensation to his contractor's injured employee is
entitled to indemnity from the contractor.12
ACCIDENTS OCCURRING DURING THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
Where an employee is transported to and from work in a
conveyance furnished by his employer, the problem as to what
effect should be given to a substantial deviation from the short-
est route home is a novel one. The question of deviation usually
arises in cases where the employee, who is already on the job,
has been directed to drive to an assigned business destination
and he then departs from the usual or shortest route to that
destination in order to serve some purpose of his own. By con-
trast, however, in the case of the deviation en route to the
employee's home we are obliged to assume at the outset that
during the entire journey the employee is engaged in a purely
personal trip which is normally outside the course of employ-
ment but which is brought within the employment only because
the employer has interested himself in the transportation of
the employee. There can be no question here of a deviation from
11. 137 So. 2d 127 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
12.,LA R.S. 23:1061 (1950) discussed in MALONE, LouiSIANA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE § 127 (1951).
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an:errand which is being performed as a duty to the employer.
It seems therefore that the proper inquiry in this type of case
is whether the trip upon which the accident happened was of a
kind that was fairly within the reasonable contemplation of the
employer when he undertook to provide the transportation. In
Jagneaux v. Marquette Casualty Co.,13 plaintiff and his brother
drove to and from work in a truck provided by the employer
and which was driven by the brother. On the occasion in ques-
tion the brother determined to drive to a nearby town on a
personal errand before proceeding to their home, which was
in another direction. After the completion of the errand and
while the brothers were on the route home they were involved
in an accident. The court allowed recovery by following the
familiar Louisiana position that where the employee has de-
viated from a business errand but has completed the deviation
at the time the accident occurs, he is regarded as having re-
entered the course of employment. It is suggested that a pref-
erable approach would be to inquire whether the employer fairly
contemplated that on trips home by these workers they would
occasionally make deviations such as the one in question.
In the Jagneaux case the court supported a recovery on the
further ground that the injured worker was not driving at the
time, and the deviation of the person chosen by the employer
to operate the vehicle was not attributable to the plaintiff, a
mere passenger.
BOILER DEAFNESS AS OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
A worker who sustains a progressive loss of hearing by
reason of continued exposure to noise may find that he is not
entitled to workmen's compensation because the symptoms of
injury accumulated gradually and he is therefore unable to
establish that he suffered an "accidental injury.' 1 4 In such a
situation he will find little comfort from the occupational dis-
ease provision of the statute, since deafness is not one of the
listed afflictions. Where, however, he complains of deafness
within a few days of his initial exposure to noise his situation
may be rescued by resort to an observation previously made :by
our courts that conditions which produce injury within a few
days of exposure should be regarded as complying with the
13. 135 So. 2d 794 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
: 14.. XLONE, LOUISIANA WORKAIEN'S COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE § 215
(1951), and cases cited.
1963]-' - /
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
"accident" requirement.15 Such was the conclusion reached dur-
ing the past term with reference to occupational deafness in
Whitworth v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp.16
TUBERCULOSIS AS ACCIDENT WHEN CONTRACTED
AS RESULT OF SINGLE ExPOsuRE
In the recent decision Vidrine v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co.17 claimant, who had previously enjoyed good health, was
confined to bed with pneumonitis for several days prior to the
date in question. He received an emergency call to report for
work, and he thereupon engaged in very strenuous labor in in-
clement weather for an entire day. Upon his return to his bed
he promptly developed tuberculosis of a rapidly progressive
type, which disabled him. Medical testimony established that a
single day of exposure of the type experienced by claimant
would probably account for the immediate development of the
tuberculosis condition described. Every element of accidental
injury is present in such a situation and the court properly
awarded compensation despite the contention that the statute
expressly excludes tuberculosis from the scope of the occupa-
tional disease provision.'8 That the occasion which constituted
the "accident" was an entire day of exposure and strain was not
fatal to the worker's claim. Frostbite and sunburn, which may
not develop except as the result of extended though not cumula-
tive exposures to the weather, have never been denied their
character as accidents for that reason. Injuries resulting from
such exposures are in no sense the type of "cumulative harm"
that must be characterized as occupational disease. 19
TOTAL DISABILITY
An interesting problem was presented in Guidry v. Michigan
Mutual Liability Co.20 In that case a worker had suffered an
injury prior to the accident in question, but the disabling symp-
toms had become quiescent. Thereafter, by reason of the accident
in question his susceptibility to a reactivation of these symptoms
15. Glover v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 10 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
16. 135 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
17. 137 So. 2d 666 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
18. LA. R.S. 23:1031.1(B) (1950).
19. See the discussion in MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAw & PRACTICE § 215 (1951) and Supplement § 210 (1962).
20. 130 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). Accord, Mitchell v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 136 So. 2d 143 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
(Vol. XXIII
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was demonstrably increased. It was held that under such cir-
cumstances he was not thereafter obliged to engage in work
that would expose him to the risk of further harm and was
entitled to compensation for total disability. This is a variation
on the general rule that an employee is totally disabled whenever
continuation of the same work would present a potential danger
to his health or safety.21
21. See, for example, McKnight v. Clemons, 114 go. 2d 114 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1959) ; Finn v. Delta Drilling Co., 121 So. 2d 340 (La. App. lst Cir. 1960).
